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Abstract
In this work we analyze an evolutionary game that incorporates the ideas pre-
sented by Cipolla in his work The fundamental laws of human stupidity. The
game considers four strategies, three of them are inherent to the player behav-
ior and can evolve via an imitation dynamics, while the fourth one is associated
to an eventual behavior that can be adopted by any player at any time with
certain probability. This fourth strategy corresponds to what Cipolla calls a
stupid person. The probability of behaving stupidly acts as a parameter that
induces a phase transition in the steady the distribution of strategies among the
population.
1. Introduction
In 1988 Cipolla wrote an essay entitled The fundamental laws of human
stupidity [1]. The structure of this essay consisted in several chapters with
some of them intended for the introduction and discussion of each of the five
fundamental laws that according to Cipolla rule the human stupidity.
As the concept of stupidity can be ambiguous it is important to properly
frame the meaning we embrace here. A stupid person is someone given to
unintelligent decisions or acts but here we consider those acts within a social
context. Stupidity should not be understood as the opposite of intelligence. In
fact, according to some of the ideas of Cipolla, none of us gets rid of or will
never get rid of a brief moment of stupidity.
The association of stupidity to a source of collective troubles and nuisance
and to the origin of social scourges has been manifested through history in
several nowadays popular quotes . Among them it is worth citing a phrase
credited to A. Dumas: ”One thing that humbles me deeply is to see that human
genius has its limits while human stupidity does not” [2]. B. Russell, in his
essay The triumph of stupidity wrote: ”The fundamental cause of the trouble is
Email address: kuperman@cab.cnea.gov.ar (Marcelo N. Kuperman)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier March 12, 2020
that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full
of doubt” [3].
Cipolla starts by preventing us about the silent danger of stupidity in the
first law. There he affirms that detecting a stupid person is a hard task. This
law states that always and inevitably everyone underestimates the number of
stupid individuals in circulation.
While it could be tempting to associate stupidity with lack of education or
training, Cipolla affirms that the probability that a certain person be stupid is
independent of any other characteristic of that person. This is the content of
the second law. This somehow suggests that there is a natural stupidity, which
resists any academic training.
But again, we are here interested in an operational definition of stupidity,
the one that is dangerous for others, an idea that can be summarized by a quote
taken from one of M. Atwood novels, [4]: “Stupidity is the same as evil if you
judge by the results.”
This idea is expressed in Cipolla’s third law: A stupid person is a person who
causes losses to another person or to a group of persons while himself deriving
no gain and even possibly incurring losses.
This law also suggest the definition of three other phenotypes that com-
plement the stupid group (S). These three groups, according to Cipolla, are
the intelligent people (I), whose actions benefit both themselves and others,
the bandits (B), who benefits themselves at the expense of others, and finally
the helpless or unaware people (U), whose actions enrich others at their own
expense.
Stupid people are dangerous and damaging because their behavior is hard
to understand and predict from a rational point of view. The bandit’s actions,
while producing some damage, obey a predictable pattern of rationality. The
possibility to foresee the behavior of a bandit can help an individual to build
up defenses against it. On the contrary, when facing a stupid person this is
impossible. So, while most of the time the evil has a clear face and is easily
identifiable, stupidity is not. This biased evaluation is what is considered in
the forth law: Non-stupid people always underestimate the damaging power of
stupid individuals. In particular non-stupid people constantly forget that at all
times and places and under any circumstances to deal and/or associate with
stupid people always turns out to be a costly mistake.
The effect of stupidity and the difficulty to recognize it is what leads us to
the fifth law: A stupid person is the most dangerous type of person.
Cipolla characterized the four groups in terms of two parameters; the own
gains or losses p, and the gains or losses that an individual inflicts on others, q.
The payoff resulting from the interaction between two persons can be definedin
terms of these quantities associated to the identification of the participants with
one of the four defined groups. These four groups can then be characterized by
the range of values adopted by p and q as follows :
S : ps ≤ 0 y qs < 0
U : pu ≤ 0 y qu ≥ 0
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I : pi > 0 y qe ≥ 0
B : pb > 0 y qb < 0
In [5] we presented a four strategy game based on this four groups. The
payoff of the strategies was defined by the values of p and q as presented in
Table 1, that indicates which is the payoff of the strategy at the file when
competing with the strategy at the column
S U I B
S ps + qs ps + qu ps + qi ps + qb
U pu + qs pu + qu pu + qi pu + qb
I pi + qs pi + qu pi + qi pi + qb
B pb + qs pb + qu pb + qi pb + qb
Table 1: Payoff Table
The results shown in [5] supported the validity of the law enunciated by
Cipolla that contained some appreciations about the dangerousness of the pres-
ence of stupid people. In this work, the evaluation of the effect of the actions
of this group was done by calculating the total wealth of the population in the
steady state of the strategy profile resulting from an evolutionary game and an
imitation dynamics. The presence of stupid people not only undermined the
total wealth but also promoted the inhibition of cooperative behaviors repre-
sented by intelligent and unaware people. In that work we could not find a
critical value for the fraction of stupids that could divide the behavior of the
system into two different regimes. According to the the first law it is not pos-
sible to know the number of stupid individuals in a population, so it might be
interesting to find different regimes for different fraction of stupid people.
In the present work we have adopted a different approach, interpreting
Cipolla’ s idea in a different way. We will consider a three strategy game,
where the participating strategies will be (I), (B) and (U) and we will let any
individual to occasionally behave as a stupid person with a given probability.
This probability is the parameter that will govern the amount of stupid people
at each time.
This means that being stupid will not be a permanent state by an occasional
state accounting for the possibility that at any time any individual can behave
stupidly. In the following sections we present a more thorough description of
the the model and the numerical results.
2. The model
As mentioned before, we are going to consider an evolutionary game, with
four strategies though one of them, the (S), differs from the others in the sense
that it is not durable and it can not be imitated. Any individual can be stupid
at any time and during one time step with probability ρs .
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While stupidity will not be a permanent condition on this version of the
game, we still need to define the payoff of each of the three strategies when
playing between them and when ocassionally confronting with a stupid person.
We also need to define the payoff that an eventual stupid player may receive.
We introduce then a 4x4 payoff matrix
A =


ps + qs ps + qu ps + qi ps + qb
pu + qs pu + qu pu + qi pu + qb
pi + qs pi + qu pi + qi pi + qb
pb + qs pb + qu pb + qi pb + qb


To compare the effects of this new model with those obtained in [5], we will
adopt the values in Table 2.
xi xb xd xe yi yb yd ye
1 [1.1,2] [-2,-1] [-2,-1] 1 -1 1 -1
Table 2: Chosen values for the payoff matrix
The only Nash equilibrium of this game is strategy (B). As shown in [5],
considering the chosen values for the payoffs, the sub game in which only the
strategies (I) and (B) participate constitutes a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or a
Donation Game [6] .
Despite that there is only one Nash equilibrium and thus an evolutionary
game ruled by the replicator mean field equations will have only one steady
state, when considering a spatially extended game with players located on top a
network, the steady state can show a different steady configuration [7, 8, 9, 10].
In order to compare the results obtained here with those previously shown in
[5] we locate the players on top of the networks used in that work . We consider
a particular family of regular networks, i.e. with all the node having the same
degree, but with a tunable degree of disorder. These networks. described in
[12] present a topology that varies according to a disorder parameter pid. This
parameter is responsible for the change in the value of the clustering coefficient
C of the network. This dependence is shown if Fig. (1)
We will adopt a simple evolutionary dynamics for the strategies considering
a deterministic imitation. In each round a selected player plays with all its
neighbors. In turn, these neighbors do the same with their own. After that
selected player analyses its performance or earnings and compares them with
that of its neighbors. Then, it adopts the strategy of the player with the highest
gain, that eventually can be its own one. In case of tie the choice is decided at
random. This update dynamics is the simplest one, representing a deterministic
imitation and closely linked to the replicator dynamics [11].
Players will play according to their chosen strategy, that can be (I), (B) or
(U) but at any time, any player can adopt the strategy (S) with probability ρs.
This election will not be permanent, will last only one time step (there is always
a probability ρns of adopting the (S) strategy during n consecutive steps) and
after that, the player will adopt the original behavior or change it to imitate
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Figure 1: Mean clustering coefficient of the used networks as a function of the degree of
disorder
the neighbor with the highest payoff. We recall that the (S) strategy can not be
imitated, but this is not an issue as under any circumstance a player adopting
the (S) strategy will obtain the higher payoff. The fact that there is probability
ρs of adopting strategy (S) means that at each time step there is a mean effective
population of ρsN stupids, where N is the total population size.
3. Results
In our simulations we considered networks of N = 105 nodes and the sys-
tem evolved untill reaching a steady state. The degree of disorder pid and the
probability of adopting the (S) strategy at each time step ρs were chosen as
parameters. The results are shown in Fig. (2)
We observe that the topology of the network has a minor effect on the evo-
lution of the strategy profile of the population. On the contrary the probability
of adopting the (S) strategy plays a crucial role. The system shows the exis-
tence of a critical value of ρs separating the evolution of the system towards two
differently regimes. For low values of ρs the dominating strategy is (I) while for
higher values, (B) dominates. This is clearly reflected in the left panel of Fig (2)
showing the fraction of (I) in the steady state and also in the right panel showing
the mean gain of the population. Clearly, the prevalence of (B) attempts against
the wealth of the population, and this prevalence is promoted by the sporadic
appearance of the (S) behavior. The interesting additional feature observe in
this work is the existence of two well defined ranges, and a critical ρs values
more defined when the network is more ordered.
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Figure 2: This plots shows the fraction of (I) individuals ρi (left) and the main gain of the
population in one round < ǫ > (right) as a function of ρs. All the curves correspond to a the
steady state
The presence of a sharp transition between a cooperative to a defective
steady state was not observed in [5]. To understand the relevance of this result
we refer to previous results involving evolutionary games. There are several
examples of the effect of locating the players on networks with different topolo-
gies [7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. These works show that
the evolutionary behaviour of the strategies might be affected by the underly-
ing topology of links between players, sometime promoting cooperative states
even when the Nash equilibrium is the defective strategy. In these examples,
the topology of the network is the factor responsible for different regimes. Here
we show that while the topology of the networks plays a non negligible role,
the most important parameter is the probability of a player to adopt the (S)
strategy.
The results show that as ρi increases there is a transition from a scenario
where (I) is prevalent to another one where most of the population behaves as
(B). The transition is sharper for highly ordered network and turns smoother
as pid increases. Also, the critical value at which this transition occurs moves to
right with increasing pid. This fact is shown in Fig, (3)
4. Conclusions
As we stated in the introduction, the work by Cipolla should be under-
stood in a cartoonish way. Nevertheless, it implies certain facts that deserve
to be taken into consideration. It is in this spirit that we analyzed the work
by Cipolla and the results that can be obtained by translating these ideas into
a mathematical model. Lets start by the first law. It affirms that we always
underestimate the number of stupid individuals in circulation. Inspired by this
statement we wander whether despite the density of stupids is impossible to
calculate there is a critical density separating two different scenarios or not.
We mean by this to evaluate the possibility that only by reaching a threshold
density, the group of stupid people can inflict a considerable harm to the entire
population. For that we proposed a model in which any individual is susceptible
of behaving stupidly at any time and with a certain probability. Our results
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Figure 3: This plot shows the value of ρs at which ρi = 0.5 as a function of πd. The curve is
a spline for helping visualization.
show the existence of a critical probability ρs ≈ 0.35. The transition from the
cooperative regime to the defective one is only sharp for slightly disordered net-
works, turning smoother as the disorder increases. Also, the increasing disorder
produces a displacement of ρs to higher values. The curves show that while for
low values of ρs the disorder attempts against (I), the situation is reversed for
higher degrees of disorder. These results agree with those obtained in [5] for
the case when the fraction of (I) individuals remains constant along the whole
simulation. Another interesting feature is the increase in the fraction of (I) for
higher values of ρs. This phenomenon can be attributed to a screening effect
played by the (S) population. The (I) players can not be affected and tempted
by the presence of (B) ones and then they survive. This effect has been also
found in [5].
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